GPU VulnDB

Database/Kernel, userspace & hypervisor

Linux kernel io_uring: per-task restrictions are freed across exec, so post-exec rings are unrestricted

CVE-2026-80713Kernel, userspace & hypervisorcurated

Impact

Per-task io_uring restrictions are meant to apply to every ring a task creates. The exec cancellation path called __io_uring_free(), which released the restriction along with the task context, so any ring created after an exec ran with no restrictions at all. Where io_uring restrictions are part of a sandbox or runtime confinement around tenant workloads, a local process can shed that confinement simply by exec'ing and opening a new ring. The CVSS vector records a scope change, consistent with escaping the confinement boundary rather than just corrupting state inside it. The practical footprint depends on whether io_uring is enabled for tenant workloads on your nodes - many GPU clusters disable io_uring outright for untrusted pods, which removes this entirely.

Who can reach it

Local, unprivileged user or container process that is allowed to call io_uring_setup. No authentication beyond code execution on the node; not reachable over the network.

What to do

Pick up a stable kernel containing the fix (commits bc0e8faf90e7 and fcef9325afee); no fixed release number is stated in the record, so check your vendor kernel's changelog. Applying it means installing a kernel and rebooting - drain the node's GPU workloads first, since this cannot be hot-patched into a running io_uring implementation. Interim mitigation on multi-tenant nodes is to block io_uring for untrusted workloads (seccomp profile or kernel.io_uring_disabled), which is cheap and needs no reboot.

References

Related entries

All Kernel, userspace & hypervisor entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.