GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

LangSmith SDK: pulling a public Hub prompt deserializes attacker-controlled LangChain objects

CVSS 7.1CVE-2026-45134AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

The SDK's prompt pull methods fetch a manifest from the LangSmith Hub and deserialize it into LangChain objects and model configuration without distinguishing a public, third-party-owned prompt from one inside the caller's own organization. Anything on the fleet that pulls a prompt by owner/name - an agent worker, a batch inference job, a notebook - takes runtime behavior from a party outside the operator's control, which can redirect model calls or leak data the process holds (API keys, tenant inputs). On a GPU node this is a code-behavior change inside a long-lived serving or training process that already holds credentials for the cluster. The record rates it confidentiality-high and requires that someone actually pull such a prompt.

Who can reach it

No authentication to the victim's systems. The attacker only needs to publish or control a public prompt on the LangSmith Hub; a user or job on the fleet must then pull it by owner/name.

What to do

Upgrade to LangSmith SDK Python 0.8.0 or JS/TS 0.6.0 and restart the processes that import it - serving workers, agent runners, notebook kernels. No node reboot or firmware work. Until then, restrict prompt pulls to identifiers owned by your own organization.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.