GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

MLflow AI Gateway: unvalidated api_base in gateway secrets turns the proxy endpoint into an authenticated SSRF

CVE-2026-71211AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

A user who can create a gateway secret sets auth_config.api_base to any URL - scheme, host and IP range are never checked - and the value is stored as given. The raw_proxy endpoint then issues a request to that base plus a caller-supplied path and returns the full response body to the caller, so this is a readable SSRF, not a blind one. On a GPU cluster the MLflow server usually runs with a workload identity and sits inside the cluster network, so the reachable set includes loopback services on its own pod, internal APIs that were never meant to be exposed, and whatever the node's link-local endpoints serve. The vendor scores confidentiality high and integrity low, which matches read-anything-the-server-can-reach.

Who can reach it

Authenticated MLflow user with enough rights to create a gateway secret (the vendor vector is PR:L), reaching the MLflow server over the network.

What to do

The record links only the MLflow v3.14.0 source tree and names no fixed release, so do not schedule on a version number yet - track the MLflow advisory. In the meantime restrict who can create gateway secrets, and put an egress policy on the MLflow pod that denies loopback, RFC1918 and link-local destinations so the proxy cannot reach internal targets. When a fixed release lands this is an in-place upgrade of the MLflow server process.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.