GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

terraform-mcp-server: stateless HTTP transport reuses one user's Terraform token for later callers

CVSS 10.0CVE-2026-16498Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

In stateless streamable-HTTP mode the server can carry a Terraform token from one caller into tool calls made by subsequent callers. Where this MCP server is the automation path into Terraform for a fleet - creating node pools, networks, storage, GPU instances - that means a low-privilege user's request can execute with another user's credential, and in a shared operator or multi-tenant setup with an admin-scoped token that is effectively infrastructure-wide write access. The record scores it 10.0 with a changed scope, reflecting that the damage lands in Terraform-managed infrastructure rather than in the MCP process. Nothing in the record indicates the reuse is bounded to a tenant.

Who can reach it

Any client able to reach the terraform-mcp-server HTTP endpoint and issue tool calls; no authentication of its own is needed to be handed the previous caller's credential. Exposure therefore follows wherever the endpoint is reachable from - an internal automation VLAN, a CI runner network, or an agent gateway.

What to do

Upgrade terraform-mcp-server to 1.1.0 and restart the service; this is a single daemon restart, no node disruption. Until then, stop serving the streamable-HTTP stateless transport (use stdio per-user, or keep one server instance per credential), and rotate any Terraform tokens that were handled by a shared instance, since the record does not bound who may have used them.

References

Related entries

All Control plane, storage & DevOps entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.