Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Kestra: any path ending in /configs skips Basic-Auth, giving unauthenticated flow execution as root

CVSS 10.0CVE-2026-53576Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

Kestra is used as a job/workflow orchestrator, including for data and model pipelines that feed GPU fleets. The API auth filter treats any request path whose final segment is literally configs as the public instance-config endpoint and forwards it with no credential check. Because Kestra routes resources by caller-chosen path segments, an anonymous caller can reach the flow-create and execution-trigger routes, submit a flow with a Shell or Process task, and run arbitrary commands as root inside the Kestra container. The shipped docker-compose.yml mounts /var/run/docker.sock, so that container root reaches the host Docker daemon and the host itself - an unauthenticated internet-to-host-root path wherever a Kestra UI is exposed.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can reach the Kestra HTTP API - no account, no token. Scored AV:N; if Kestra is only on an internal VLAN the reach narrows to anyone on that VLAN.

What to do

Upgrade to 1.0.45 or 1.3.21. Patch and restart the Kestra server (running executions are interrupted and must be resumed). Until then, block or authenticate /api/v1/** paths ending in configs at the reverse proxy, and remove the docker.sock bind mount so a container compromise does not become host compromise. Assume compromise if the instance was reachable: rotate any secret Kestra holds and audit the flow list for flows you did not create.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53576 https://github.com/kestra-io/kestra/security/advisories/GHSA-2q47-568g-9h4f

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.