GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

SGLang: full-resolution video decode before max_pixels clamp exhausts inference worker memory

CVSS 8.7CVE-2026-109227AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

An unauthenticated caller to a Qwen-VL deployment can submit a high-resolution video and SGLang decodes every frame at source resolution before applying the max_pixels limit, so the memory spike happens before any budget is enforced. Concurrent requests push the worker out of memory and the serving process dies, taking the GPUs it had pinned with it. On a GPU node this is expensive to absorb: the model weights have to be reloaded into HBM on restart, and a shared endpoint fronting several tenants loses service for all of them. No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed, availability only.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can reach the /v1/chat/completions endpoint of a Qwen-VL SGLang deployment. No authentication is required if the endpoint is exposed without a gateway in front of it.

What to do

No fixed version is named in the record - versions through 0.5.21 are affected. Track the upstream issue (sgl-project/sglang#43710). Until a fix lands, mitigate in front of the server: cap request body size and video resolution at the gateway, limit concurrency per client, and keep multimodal endpoints off untrusted networks. Applying a fix means restarting the serving daemon, which reloads model weights.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.