GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

SGLang: client can override GLM-V video decode budget via video_url fields and exhaust worker memory

CVSS 8.7CVE-2026-109228AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

The request schema lets a caller supply fps, max_frames, max_tokens_per_frame and max_image_tokens inside the video_url object, and GLM-V processing honours them. Setting them arbitrarily high makes the server decode every frame of a high-resolution video at full size, exhausting worker memory. This is a resource budget the operator thought they controlled being handed to the client, so capacity planning on the node is meaningless against a hostile request. The serving process dies and the GPUs it held go idle until weights reload. Availability only.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can post a chat completion request with a video_url object to a GLM-V SGLang deployment. No authentication required where the endpoint is directly exposed.

What to do

No fixed version is given; versions through 0.5.21 are affected. Until upstream ships a fix, strip or clamp fps, max_frames, max_tokens_per_frame and max_image_tokens at the API gateway rather than trusting the server, and rate-limit multimodal requests. A code fix requires restarting the serving daemon and reloading model weights.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.