GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Grafana: authenticated user can read SSO client secrets and change instance-wide SSO settings

CVSS 8.9CVE-2026-103506Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

Any authenticated Grafana user on an affected 13.2 instance can read the OAuth/SAML client secrets configured for the instance and rewrite instance-wide SSO settings without holding the permissions that should gate them. On a GPU fleet Grafana is usually the dashboard everyone gets - tenants, on-call, sometimes customers - and it is wired to the same identity provider as the cluster control plane, so a leaked client secret is reusable against systems well beyond metrics. Rewriting SSO settings lets the attacker redirect authentication at a provider they control and admit themselves as an admin on the next login. The record scopes this to installations that have the experimental kubernetesSsoSettingsApi feature toggle enabled; it is off by default.

Who can reach it

Any user who can authenticate to the Grafana instance - no admin role and no special permission needed. Only instances running 13.2 OSS or Enterprise with the experimental kubernetesSsoSettingsApi toggle switched on are affected.

What to do

Check whether kubernetesSsoSettingsApi is enabled; if it is not, you are not exposed and nothing is required. If it is, the cheapest immediate mitigation is to turn the toggle off and restart Grafana, which is a single daemon restart with no effect on GPU nodes. Then upgrade to the fixed 13.2 release named in the Grafana advisory. Treat any SSO client secret that was readable as burned and rotate it at the identity provider, plus review SSO settings for unauthorized changes.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.