GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

terraform-mcp-server: knowing another user's MCP session ID runs tool calls with their Terraform credentials

CVSS 8.9CVE-2026-16496Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

A separate flaw from the stateless credential reuse in the same advisory: here the stateful transport treats possession of an MCP session ID as authorization, so anyone who obtains a session ID executes Terraform tool calls under that session's credentials. For an operator this is privilege escalation into infrastructure provisioning - whatever the victim's Terraform token can change in the fleet, the attacker can change. Session IDs are the kind of value that leaks through logs, proxy traces and error output, so the practical barrier is lower than the high attack complexity in the vector suggests.

Who can reach it

A remote client that can reach the server's HTTP endpoint and has learned a valid session ID belonging to another user. No credential of the attacker's own is required; the record states no prior authentication.

What to do

Upgrade terraform-mcp-server to 1.1.0 and restart the service - a daemon restart only. Before the upgrade, restrict who can reach the HTTP endpoint and avoid the shared stateful transport for privileged Terraform tokens; afterwards, invalidate existing sessions and rotate tokens whose session IDs may have been exposed in logs or proxies.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.