GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

NVIDIA NeMo Export-Deploy: server-side request forgery in multimodal deployment

CVSS 5.3CVE-2026-100962AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

A server-side request forgery in the multimodal deployment path of NeMo Export-Deploy can make the model-serving process send requests the attacker chooses. NVIDIA rates the result as information disclosure. On a GPU node this matters because the serving process can usually reach addresses an outside client cannot, such as internal services, cluster-internal endpoints or cloud metadata. The record does not say which targets can be reached or what data comes back. The CVSS vector rates confidentiality impact as low.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can reach an exposed NeMo Export-Deploy multimodal endpoint over the network. No authentication or user interaction is needed (CVSS AV:N/PR:N/UI:N).

What to do

Update NeMo Export-Deploy to the release named in NVIDIA bulletin 2026/5920 and restart the serving deployment. The record does not give the fixed version. Until you patch, keep the endpoint off untrusted networks and limit the serving pod's outbound traffic to internal and metadata addresses.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.