GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

vLLM: model config.json can redirect the served model and tokenizer to another local checkpoint

CVSS 5.3CVE-2026-130684AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

A malicious model publisher can set speculators_config verifier.name_or_path in a model's config.json to point at a different local checkpoint directory (path traversal). When an operator serves that model, vLLM loads the other checkpoint's tokenizer and model instead. The attacker can then read that checkpoint's tokenizer vocabulary through unauthenticated /detokenize requests and send queries to a private model they should not reach. On shared inference nodes that keep several customers' or teams' checkpoints on local disk, one untrusted model can expose another tenant's model.

Who can reach it

Someone who publishes a model that an operator then loads into vLLM (user interaction: the model has to be deployed). After that, any client that can reach the vLLM HTTP endpoint can use /detokenize without authentication.

What to do

Upgrade vLLM to 0.33.0 or later and restart the serving processes or pods. Until then, only serve models from trusted publishers, review config.json speculators_config fields before deployment, and keep other checkpoints out of paths the vLLM process can read.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.