Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Apache Airflow: proxy URLs with embedded credentials are not masked in task logs

CVSS 7.5CVE-2025-68675Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

Airflow is a common scheduler and orchestration layer for training and batch GPU pipelines. The proxies/proxy fields of a Connection were not treated as sensitive, so a proxy URL containing an embedded username and password is written to task logs in cleartext. Anyone who can read task logs - which on a shared cluster is typically a far wider group than the people allowed to read Connections - recovers those credentials and can reuse them against whatever the proxy fronts. No GPU-specific code path is involved; the exposure is credential leakage through the orchestration layer.

Who can reach it

Any authenticated Airflow user with log-read access, on deployments where a Connection carries a proxy URL containing credentials. No special configuration needed.

What to do

Upgrade to Airflow 3.1.6 or later (Airflow 3) or 2.11.1 or later (Airflow 2) and restart the webserver/API server, scheduler and workers. Rotate any proxy credentials that have already appeared in logs, and purge the affected log files - the upgrade does not clean historical logs.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68675 https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/59688 https://lists.apache.org/thread/x6kply4nqd4vc4wgxtm6g9r2tt63s8c5

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.