GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Apache Airflow: session cookie is set at path=/ regardless of base_url, enabling cross-app takeover

CVSS 7.5CVE-2026-28779Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

Airflow 3.1.0 through 3.1.7 sets the _token session cookie with path=/ even when the webserver or API is mounted under a sub-path via base_url. Any other application served from the same domain - a Grafana, a notebook proxy, a team dashboard sharing the cluster ingress hostname - receives valid Airflow session tokens in its own request headers and can replay them for full session takeover. This is the normal arrangement on a GPU cluster that fronts several internal tools behind one hostname with path routing, and it requires no flaw in Airflow itself to exploit; whoever controls or compromises a co-hosted path inherits Airflow sessions, including those of admins.

Who can reach it

Anyone who controls or can read requests to any application co-hosted on the same domain as Airflow, once an authenticated Airflow user's browser visits it. No Airflow credentials needed.

What to do

Upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.1.8 or later and restart the API server/webserver; existing sessions should be invalidated afterwards. Until then, move Airflow to its own hostname rather than a shared-domain sub-path, so the cookie cannot be sent to a neighbouring app.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.