Facility power / DCIM as a class: PDUs, CRAC controllers, BMS and DCIM platforms run long-lived embedded firmware, sit

Impact

PDUs, CRAC controllers, BMS and DCIM platforms run long-lived embedded firmware, sit on flat facility networks, and are frequently outside the compute operator's change-control. An attacker with PDU control has a physical-availability weapon against a GPU cluster

Who can reach it

Network, facility LAN

What to do

Contractual and architectural: demand facility-network segmentation and a firmware SLA from the colo provider, and monitor the power plane independently. For a tenant in someone else's datacenter there is no patch you can apply yourself

References

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