GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

LangChain4j agentic: unsafe Jackson default typing in AgenticScope deserialization allows arbitrary class instantiation

CVSS 1.2CVE-2026-97869AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

AgenticScopeSerializer.fromJson in the LangChain4j agentic module deserializes persisted agent scope with Jackson default typing enabled, so a crafted record in the persistence store can instantiate arbitrary classes on the JVM running the agent. On a GPU fleet that JVM typically sits next to model endpoints and holds their credentials, so class instantiation there is a foothold in the serving tier rather than in a sandbox. The practical reach is narrow: AgenticScope persistence is opt-in, and the attacker must already be able to write to that store, which is why the record scores 1.2. A proof of concept has been published.

Who can reach it

An attacker who can already write to the AgenticScope persistence store of an application that has explicitly enabled AgenticScope persistence. Not reachable in the default configuration, and not reachable by an unauthenticated network caller.

What to do

Upgrade to langchain4j 1.5.3-beta11, 1.11.10-beta19 or 1.18.1-beta28 depending on your release line; all maintained lines are patched. Rebuild and redeploy the agent service. If you cannot upgrade now, the effective mitigation is the same as the precondition: keep the AgenticScope store writable only by the application itself, or leave persistence disabled.

References

Related entries

All AI/ML frameworks & serving entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.