OpenStack Ironic: vendor_passthru permits DELETE and GET against a node's BMC Redfish service

CVSS 5.4CVE-2026-90458Firmware, BMC & network fabriccurated

Impact

Ironic's vendor_passthru interface allowed DELETE and GET requests to be relayed to a managed node's BMC, so an authenticated Ironic API user can reach the Redfish service on the baseboard controller - the published example is deleting accounts from it. In a GPU fleet Ironic is the bare-metal provisioning control plane and holds BMC credentials for every node, so this turns an ordinary API account into a read-and-delete channel against the out-of-band management plane that is normally isolated on its own VLAN. Deleting BMC accounts is a durable denial of out-of-band control: the node keeps running but can no longer be power-cycled, re-imaged or consoled remotely, and recovering it may need hands at the rack. The GET half also discloses BMC-side information to callers who should only see Ironic's own node data.

Who can reach it

Network, authenticated. Any principal that can call the Ironic API with rights to invoke vendor_passthru on a node; no access to the management VLAN itself is needed because Ironic performs the request on the caller's behalf.

What to do

Upgrade Ironic to 39.0.1 or later (or apply your distribution's backport) and restart the ironic-api and ironic-conductor services; this is a control-plane service restart, not a fleet reboot, and managed nodes are unaffected. Until then, tighten the policy on vendor_passthru so only trusted operators hold it, and audit BMC accounts on managed nodes for unexpected deletions.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90458 https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2026-047.html https://bugs.launchpad.net/ironic/+bug/2166507 http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/22/6

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.