GPU VulnDB

Database/Kernel, userspace & hypervisor

Linux nfsd: any authenticated NFSv4.2 client can cancel and free another client's copy-notify stateid

UnscoredCVE-2026-89694Kernel, userspace & hypervisorcurated

Impact

On the OFFLOAD_CANCEL path, manage_cpntf_state() freed the target copy-notify state without checking which client created it. The lookup key si_opaque.so_id is allocated cyclically and therefore guessable, and the embedded clientid is the fixed per-net nn->s2s_cp_cl_id, so one authenticated NFSv4.2 client can guess and destroy another client's server-side-copy state. On a shared training cluster where one kernel NFS server exports scratch or dataset volumes to many tenants, this is a cross-tenant reach: a tenant can abort other tenants' server-side copies, and the unchecked free is state-teardown driven by an untrusted identity. The fix compares state->cp_p_clid against the requesting client's cl_clientid and returns nfserr_bad_stateid on mismatch.

Who can reach it

Any client that can mount the export and authenticate as an NFSv4.2 client. No privilege on the server is needed, and no valid knowledge of the victim's stateid beyond guessing a cyclically-allocated id.

What to do

Patch the NFS server's kernel to a stable release carrying the ownership check and reboot the server node. Client GPU nodes need nothing. This is a storage-server reboot, not a fleet-wide drain, but it interrupts every mount unless the server is HA-paired. No mitigation short of disabling NFSv4.2 server-side copy is named in the record.

References

Related entries

All Kernel, userspace & hypervisor entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.