GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Ansible automation-controller: REST filter oracle on workflow artifacts leaks no_log secrets across organizations

CVSS 6.5CVE-2026-84720Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

The database column holding merged set_stats artifacts passed between workflow nodes is persisted before Ansible applies no_log masking, and the REST filter backend accepts arbitrary field lookups against it even though the serializer hides it. An attacker uses result counts as a boolean oracle to recover secret values character by character. Red Hat states this works for a user with only read access to a workflow, and - through a regex lookup that bypasses the JSON cross-relation filter guard via the world-readable credential-types endpoint - for any authenticated user with no roles at all, including across organization boundaries. For a fleet managed by AAP those secrets are typically the credentials the controller uses to reach GPU nodes, BMCs, registries and cloud APIs, so this is a path from a low-privilege controller account to infrastructure credentials.

Who can reach it

Any authenticated automation-controller API user, including one holding no roles, over the network. No access to the target organization's workflows is required for the credential-types regex path.

What to do

Apply the vendor errata for your AAP stream (RHSA-2026:71113, 71114, 71177, 71179) and restart automation-controller; no node drain is involved. Because the leak is of secrets already stored in the artifacts table, treat any no_log value that passed through a workflow as exposed and rotate it after patching - patching alone does not undo prior disclosure.

References

Related entries

All Control plane, storage & DevOps entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.