Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

OpenChoreo cluster-gateway: unauthenticated management API exposes data-plane Kubernetes API and pod exec

CVSS 9.6CVE-2026-73843Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

The cluster-gateway served its caller-facing management APIs on the externally reachable agent listener with no authentication, so anyone who can open a connection to that listener can call /api/proxy/ and /api/exec/. That means proxying the data-plane Kubernetes API and running commands inside workload pods on any managed cluster. In a multi-cluster fleet this collapses the boundary between the management plane and every tenant workload: an attacker reads secrets and service-account tokens mounted in pods, and gets a shell inside containers that may be holding GPU devices. Fixed in 1.0.2 and 1.1.2.

Who can reach it

Anyone with network reach to the cluster-gateway agent listener - adjacent network per the vendor vector (AV:A) - with no authentication and no prior account in the platform.

What to do

Upgrade OpenChoreo to 1.0.2 or 1.1.2 and restart the cluster-gateway deployment; no node drain or reboot is needed. Until the upgrade lands, restrict the agent listener to the control-plane network with a NetworkPolicy or firewall rule so it is not reachable from tenant or general datacenter networks.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73843 https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/releases/tag/v1.0.2 https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/commit/047d80ddc63b4b4b9dd67044d5cffcdbd77685ce https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/pull/4122

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.