GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Envoy: path normalization misses ..;param segments, bypassing path-based routing and RBAC

CVSS 5.3CVE-2026-73551Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

Envoy's normalizer does not treat . and .. as dot segments when they carry a semicolon parameter, so /user/..;foo=bar/admin is not collapsed to /admin even with path normalization enabled. Envoy then makes its routing and RBAC decision on the uncollapsed path while an upstream that follows RFC 3986 resolves it to the real target. Where Envoy is the ingress or service-mesh sidecar in front of cluster services - schedulers, model endpoints, admin APIs - a remote client can reach a path that a path-based authorization policy was supposed to block. Exploitability depends on the upstream actually interpreting the segment differently, or on Envoy making a path-based decision at all; a deployment that authorizes purely on mTLS identity and not on path is not affected.

Who can reach it

Any remote client that can send an HTTP request through the affected Envoy listener. No authentication required - the point of the bug is to get past the authorization check.

What to do

Upgrade Envoy to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, or 1.39.1. For a standalone edge proxy this is a package or image update and a rolling restart of the proxy fleet; for a service mesh it means rolling the sidecar image, which restarts every injected pod - schedule it like any mesh data-plane rollout. No node reboot. As an interim mitigation, reject request paths containing ; at the edge, or move the affected authorization decisions off raw path matching.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.