GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Prowler: legacy gcp auth-provider in kubeconfig runs commands on the shared scan worker

CVSS 9.9CVE-2026-73263Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

Prowler's kubeconfig validator rejected exec blocks but not the legacy gcp auth-provider with cmd-path and cmd-args, so POST /api/v1/providers/{id}/connection loads attacker-supplied kubeconfig content and the Kubernetes client runs that command through subprocess.Popen on the shared worker. Any low-privilege tenant of a Prowler deployment therefore gets code execution on the worker that scans every other tenant's environment - and that worker holds or can reach the cloud and cluster credentials for all of them. For an operator running Prowler over their Kubernetes GPU clusters, the compromise is not of the scanner but of the credential set the scanner uses, which typically includes broad read access across the fleet.

Who can reach it

Network access to the Prowler API with any authenticated low-privilege account able to add a provider and run a connection test. Execution lands on the shared Celery-style worker, not on the caller's own infrastructure.

What to do

Upgrade to Prowler 5.36.0 and restart the API and worker processes (fix in commit 0b782fc extends the validator to cover the legacy auth-provider path). No configuration workaround is published; restricting who may add Kubernetes providers narrows the caller pool but does not close it. This is a container/daemon restart of the Prowler stack, not a fleet action. On a multi-tenant deployment, rotate the cloud and cluster credentials the workers hold.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.