GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Airflow Google provider: team scope dropped in Secret Manager backend, so one team resolves another's credentials

CVSS 6.5CVE-2026-68868Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

The Google Cloud Secret Manager secrets backend accepted the caller's team_name but dropped it at the internal call boundary, so every Connection and Variable lookup resolved against the team-agnostic secret name. In multi-team mode a task or Dag belonging to one team therefore resolved another team's Connection and received its credentials in full - not a partial disclosure, the working secret. This is a tenant isolation failure in the exact mechanism that was supposed to enforce it, and it needs no unusual configuration beyond enabling multi-team mode with this backend. Any pipeline that runs on the fleet becomes a way to collect other teams' cloud and cluster credentials.

Who can reach it

Anyone able to author or run a Dag or task under any team on a multi-team Airflow deployment using the Google Cloud Secret Manager secrets backend. Authenticated, but ordinary pipeline-author access is enough.

What to do

Upgrade apache-airflow-providers-google to 22.3.0 or later, which builds and applies the team-scoped secret name, and restart schedulers, triggerers and workers so the new provider is loaded. Treat cross-team credential exposure as having happened: rotate the Connections and Variables that teams could have resolved through the backend. No GPU node drain.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.