GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

InstructLab: model loading hardcodes trust_remote_code=True, executing code from HuggingFace models

CVSS 8.8CVE-2026-6859AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

linux_train.py loads HuggingFace models with trust_remote_code=True unconditionally, so any model repository's custom Python runs as the user invoking ilab train, download, or generate. On a shared fine-tuning node that is arbitrary code execution with access to the GPUs, the local dataset, mounted storage, and any cloud credentials in the environment. Red Hat ships this in RHEL AI 3, where the training user frequently has broad access to the accelerator fleet. Exploitation needs a user to be persuaded to use a specific model, which is routine in practice.

Who can reach it

Remote attacker publishes a malicious model on the HuggingFace Hub; a local user with GPU access runs ilab train/download/generate against it. No authentication to the attacker-controlled side; user interaction required.

What to do

Apply the Red Hat update for RHEL AI 3 when available and restart any training workflows; the Red Hat CVE page and VEX document track fixed package state. Until patched, restrict which model repositories the fine-tuning nodes can pull from and treat any model directory as executable code.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.