GPU VulnDB

Database/Firmware, BMC & network fabric

TPM 2.0: timing side channel in RSA OAEP decryption can expose TPM-managed key material and forge attestations

CVSS 5.9CVE-2026-6727Firmware, BMC & network fabriccurated

Impact

A privileged local attacker with access to the TPM command interface can measure timing differences in RSA OAEP decryption and recover information that allows decryption of ciphertexts sealed to TPM-managed RSA keys, including the Endorsement Key, import blobs, credential blobs and session salts. Under some conditions this extends to forging TPM 2.0 attestations. For a GPU fleet that gates confidential computing, disk unsealing or node admission on TPM attestation, a forged quote means a node that is not in the state it claims can still join the cluster and receive tenant workloads. The trust anchor is the thing broken here, so every downstream check built on it inherits the doubt.

Who can reach it

A local attacker holding privileged access to the TPM command interface on the host (root or equivalent, via /dev/tpm0 or the platform firmware path). Not reachable from a tenant container without that access, and not remote.

What to do

The TCG advisory (TCGVRT0011) is the authority here; the record names no fixed version, so do not assume one. Fixes arrive as TPM firmware or platform BIOS updates from the TPM and server vendors, which means flashing each affected node with it out of service - a per-node maintenance window across the fleet. Until vendor firmware ships, treat TPM-sealed secrets and remote attestation results as weaker than assumed: keep the TPM interface restricted to root, and do not rely on TPM quotes alone for node admission on hosts where untrusted code can gain root.

References

Related entries

All Firmware, BMC & network fabric entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.