Red Hat ACM submariner-operator: unvalidated image in the Submariner CR runs attacker code cluster-wide

Impact

The submariner-operator accepts an unvalidated image path from the Submariner custom resource, so anyone who can modify that CR gets the operator to deploy their image with elevated privileges anywhere in the cluster, including on control-plane nodes. The interesting case is not the cluster administrator — they already have this power — but any role that was delegated Submariner CR edit rights on the assumption that it only configured cross-cluster networking. That delegation silently becomes cluster-wide code execution. On a GPU cluster, an attacker-supplied privileged pod on a control-plane node also means access to the credentials that drive the rest of the fleet.

Who can reach it

An authenticated user holding permission to modify the Submariner CR — cluster administrators, plus any narrower role that was granted edit on that resource. No unauthenticated path.

What to do

Red Hat tracks the fix on its CVE page and Bugzilla 2507528; the record given here does not name a fixed submariner-operator build, so check that page for the errata rather than assuming a version. In the meantime the effective mitigation is RBAC: audit who can modify Submariner CRs and remove that permission from any role that is not already effectively cluster-admin.

References