GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

NVIDIA AIStore: ETL management API missing authorization on job read and start/stop

CVSS 8.6CVE-2026-65172Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

The ETL management API on the AIStore proxy does not check authorization, so crafted GET or POST requests disclose ETL job information and start or stop existing ETL jobs. On a shared GPU cluster that means one tenant can enumerate another tenant's data-processing pipelines and halt them, stalling the dataset preparation that GPU jobs are waiting on, or restart them to burn capacity. This is the authorization gap in the ETL control surface, distinct from the ETL PodSpec injection in CVE-2026-65162 - here the attacker drives existing jobs rather than defining a new pod.

Who can reach it

Network-reachable, unauthenticated, no user interaction: any client that can send HTTP requests to an AIStore proxy.

What to do

Update AIStore per NVIDIA advisory 2026/5889 and restart the AIStore proxy daemons. The record names no fixed version. Until patched, put the proxy behind a network boundary that only trusted control-plane clients can cross, and disable ETL if the deployment does not use it.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.