GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

NVIDIA AIStore: Promote API reads any file reachable by the target process

CVSS 7.5CVE-2026-65161Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

The Promote API, which ingests files from a target's local filesystem into a bucket, accepts a crafted absolute source path and will read any file the target process can open. An unauthenticated caller can pull AIStore's configuration, credentials on disk, service-account tokens mounted into the pod, or other tenants' data under the storage mountpoints, and read it back out of the bucket. On a multi-tenant GPU cluster that is cross-tenant information disclosure from the storage tier, and any cloud or object-store credentials recovered this way extend the reach well past AIStore. Confidentiality only - no write primitive.

Who can reach it

Network-reachable, unauthenticated, no user interaction: any client that can call the AIStore Promote API.

What to do

Update AIStore per NVIDIA advisory 2026/5889 and restart the AIStore daemons - no fixed version is given in the record. In the meantime restrict access to the AIStore API to trusted networks, and assume credentials readable by the target process may already be exposed if the endpoint has been tenant-reachable.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.