NVIDIA NemoClaw: installation process executes untrusted code

CVE-2026-65081AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

The installer can be made to execute code an attacker controls, and installs of this kind normally run with elevated privileges on the node being provisioned. NVIDIA lists code execution, privilege escalation, data tampering, information disclosure and denial of service as outcomes. On a GPU fleet this matters most during provisioning and upgrade windows, when the same install path runs unattended across many nodes at once, so one poisoned install source reaches the whole batch. The record does not describe the specific input that gets trusted, so treat the exposure as install-time rather than steady-state.

Who can reach it

Network-adjacent attacker able to influence what the installation process fetches or reads (CVSS AV:N/PR:N/AC:H). No authentication stated, but the high attack complexity indicates conditions the attacker does not fully control.

What to do

Follow NVIDIA product-security bulletin 5872 for the fixed release; the CVE record names no fixed version. Until then, run NemoClaw installs only from a verified local mirror over a trusted path and re-run the install once a patched package is available. No node reboot is implied by the record.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65081 https://github.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5872 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65081

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.