GPU VulnDB

Database/Kernel, userspace & hypervisor

Linux kernel KVM guest_memfd: signed offset+size arithmetic defeats the binding overflow check

CVSS 7.0CVE-2026-64283Kernel, userspace & hypervisorcurated

Impact

When binding a memslot to a guest_memfd file, KVM took the offset and size as signed loff_t values. The size is bounded by KVM's memslot limits, but the offset is unchecked until the final "offset + size > i_size" test, so a near-maximum positive offset makes the sum wrap negative and always compare smaller than the file size. KVM then accepts an absurd out-of-range binding. guest_memfd is the backing store for confidential guests (SEV-SNP/TDX), so on a GPU host that runs tenant VMs this is a memory-safety hole in the path that is supposed to isolate guest private memory from the host. The record does not describe a working exploit, only the broken bound check; the actor is whoever drives the KVM ioctls, i.e. the VMM, not an unprivileged guest.

Who can reach it

Local user or service able to issue KVM ioctls - in practice the VMM process (QEMU, Firecracker, a cloud agent) or anyone with /dev/kvm. Not reachable from the network, and not reachable from inside a guest.

What to do

Update to a stable kernel carrying the fix (commits 3f9c0fdefa04, e4683654881f, eba85fee7fc6, f3a98d5881b9) or the distribution equivalent, then reboot the hypervisor hosts. Live-migrate or drain tenant VMs first; there is no mitigation short of the new kernel.

References

Related entries

All Kernel, userspace & hypervisor entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.