GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

vLLM: audio input in chat completions skips the decode-duration limit, letting a small clip OOM the worker

CVSS 6.5CVE-2026-57173AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

The input_audio handler for /v1/chat/completions calls AudioMediaIO.load_bytes/load_file without passing VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S, so the duration cap that protects /v1/audio/transcriptions never applies. A small, heavily compressed clip expands into a very large float32 PCM buffer and takes the worker out of memory; inline data URLs reach this path without even being bounded by VLLM_AUDIO_FETCH_TIMEOUT. On a GPU node, a crashed vLLM worker drops every in-flight request on those GPUs and the restart has to reload model weights, so recovery is measured in minutes, not seconds. Only deployments serving an audio-capable model are affected; whether the request needs authentication depends on how the endpoint is fronted.

Who can reach it

Any client that can POST to /v1/chat/completions on an audio-capable vLLM deployment. The advisory notes authentication only changes deployment-specific reachability - if the endpoint is exposed unauthenticated, so is the bug.

What to do

Upgrade vLLM to 0.24.0 and restart the serving processes - a rolling restart per replica, no node drain. If an upgrade cannot happen now, stop serving audio-capable models on exposed endpoints or put a proxy in front that rejects input_audio payloads and oversized data URLs.

References

Related entries

All AI/ML frameworks & serving entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.