GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

Open OnDemand: OIDC session key derivable from server name, allowing forged login cookies

CVSS 9.1CVE-2026-55171Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

The portal generator defaults OIDCCryptoPassphrase to SHA1 of the server name, and the ood-ansible template checks a different variable from the one documented. Administrators who set ood_oidc_crypto_passphrase can therefore still be running with a value an attacker can derive. With OIDCSessionType client-cookie, an unauthenticated remote attacker can compute the key and forge a mod_auth_openidc session cookie for any user. That gives them the user's portal session: shells, job submission and file access on the HPC cluster behind it. Server-cache deployments are exposed only to lower-impact tampering with the OIDC state and nonce cookies.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can reach the Open OnDemand web portal over the network. No authentication needed. Full session forgery requires the client-cookie OIDC session type.

What to do

Upgrade to Open OnDemand 4.1.6 or 4.2.3, or ood-ansible 4.2.1. Set a strong, random OIDCCryptoPassphrase explicitly and confirm it reaches the generated portal config. Then regenerate the portal config and restart the portal web server. Changing the passphrase invalidates existing sessions, so users will need to log in again.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.