GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Envoy Gateway: path-normalization gap in the Lua validator lets submitted Lua read controller pod files

CVSS 9.1CVE-2026-53713Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

A tenant able to create an EnvoyExtensionPolicy can submit Lua that the Strict validator accepts because the critical-path check runs before redundant separators are collapsed, so a double-slash path bypasses the deny list while Linux resolves it normally. The Lua then reads arbitrary files inside the gateway controller pod: the Kubernetes service-account token, TLS keys and certificates, and process environment. Those credentials reach the Kubernetes API server and the xDS server that programs every data-plane proxy, so a single namespace tenant can pivot into cluster-wide control over ingress for all tenants. On a shared GPU cluster where the gateway fronts inference endpoints, that means the ability to read or redirect other tenants' traffic, not just a local file disclosure.

Who can reach it

Any authenticated user with permission to create or update an EnvoyExtensionPolicy in a namespace the gateway watches - no access to the controller node or the management network is needed (CVSS PR:L, AV:N).

What to do

Upgrade Envoy Gateway to 1.7.4 or 1.8.1 and roll the controller deployment; no node drain or data-plane outage is required beyond the controller restart. Until then, restrict who can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy objects via RBAC, and treat the controller's service-account token and gateway TLS material as exposed - rotate them and review Kubernetes API audit logs for use of that identity.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.