GPU VulnDB

Database/Kernel, userspace & hypervisor

Glances: KVM domain names are interpolated into shell commands, giving root on the hypervisor host

CVSS 7.8CVE-2026-46606Kernel, userspace & hypervisorcurated

Impact

The Glances KVM/QEMU plugin reads VM domain names straight from virsh list --all and interpolates them into f-string command templates handed to secure_popen(), which by design treats &&, | and > as shell operators. A domain name containing shell metacharacters therefore executes commands as the user running Glances - on hypervisor hosts commonly root. Anyone who can create or rename a VM on a monitored host can plant that name and wait for the agent to poll it, so the path from a VM-provisioning privilege to host root needs no exploit of the hypervisor itself. On a virtualized GPU fleet, host root means control of the GPU passthrough and vGPU configuration and of every other guest on the node. Fixed in Glances 4.5.5.

Who can reach it

A local or API-level user on the hypervisor with permission to create or rename a KVM/QEMU domain; execution happens when the Glances agent next enumerates VMs. Authentication to the virtualization layer is required, root is not.

What to do

Upgrade Glances to 4.5.5 and restart the agent on every monitored hypervisor - a daemon restart, no guest downtime or node reboot. Where the upgrade must wait, disable the vms plugin on hypervisor hosts or stop running Glances as root there, and audit existing domain names for shell metacharacters.

References

Related entries

All Kernel, userspace & hypervisor entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.