GPU VulnDB

Database/Kernel, userspace & hypervisor

Linux kernel mm: stale page->private survives page free and causes a use-after-free in the swap subsystem

CVSS 7.8CVE-2026-43303Kernel, userspace & hypervisorcurated

Impact

Several subsystems - slub, shmem and the DRM TTM memory manager among them - set page->private and do not clear it before freeing the page. When such a page is later handed out as a high-order allocation and split with split_page(), the tail pages carry the stale value. The swap code assumes a freshly allocated page has page->private == 0 when it tracks swap count continuations, so it follows what it believes is a valid continuation list and walks uninitialized page->lru entries holding LIST_POISON, producing a use-after-free that KASAN reports as a wild memory access in the swapoff path. Realistically this is a node stability and memory-corruption problem rather than a clean escalation primitive, and it only bites where swap is actually in use - many GPU nodes run with swap off, which takes them out of the reported crash path. TTM appearing on the list of subsystems that leave page->private set means GPU-heavy nodes are among those that generate the stale pages in the first place.

Who can reach it

Local, unprivileged-to-low-privileged workload on the host: any code path that allocates and frees pages through the affected subsystems, followed by the swap subsystem consuming a split high-order page. Triggering it deliberately requires local execution on the node and a swap-enabled configuration; the crash was reported via swapoff.

What to do

Update to a stable kernel that clears page->private in free_pages_prepare() and reboot each affected node - a drain and reboot per GPU host, with no live-patch path since the fix is in the page allocator's free path. Where nodes already run without swap, the reported crash path is not reachable and the update can ride the next scheduled kernel roll rather than an emergency window; confirm with swapon --show per node rather than assuming.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.