GPU VulnDB

Database/Kernel, userspace & hypervisor

Linux kernel x86 shadow stacks: shstk_pop_sigframe ignores mmap_read_lock_killable() failure on signal return

CVSS 5.5CVE-2026-43109Kernel, userspace & hypervisorcurated

Impact

On signal return with CET shadow stacks enabled, shstk_pop_sigframe() called mmap_read_lock_killable() but never checked the result, so it proceeded to touch the memory map on a path where the lock was not actually taken - the functions were also missing __must_check, which is why the omission went unnoticed. The record scores the consequence as availability loss on a local, low-privilege vector. This only applies to hosts running kernels with x86 shadow-stack support on CET-capable CPUs and to processes that have shadow stacks turned on, so on most GPU fleets today the reachable surface is small; where it is enabled, an unprivileged local process can reach it through ordinary signal delivery and a killable signal. The practical cost on a GPU node is the usual asymmetry: a cheap local trigger against a host whose other tenants and in-flight jobs are the collateral.

Who can reach it

Local, authenticated: an unprivileged process running with x86 shadow stacks enabled, taking a signal and being interrupted by a killable signal during the sigframe restore. No device or management-network access involved.

What to do

Update to a stable kernel carrying the shstk error-handling and __must_check fix, then drain and reboot each node; this is compiled-in x86 core code with no module or sysctl mitigation. If you are not deliberately running CET shadow stacks on these hosts, the exposure is effectively absent and the fix can ride along with the next routine kernel roll rather than driving its own window.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.