GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

LangChain: prompt config files are loaded from unvalidated paths, letting a caller read arbitrary host files

CVE-2026-34070AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

Several functions in langchain_core.prompts.loading read files from paths embedded in a deserialized config dict without checking for directory traversal or absolute paths. Any application that lets user-influenced prompt configuration reach load_prompt() or load_prompt_from_config() hands the caller arbitrary file reads on the host, bounded only by extension checks: .txt for templates, .json and .yaml for examples. On a GPU node that is a real reach - service account tokens, kubeconfigs and mounted secrets are frequently JSON or YAML, and a serving pod usually runs with credentials that matter beyond itself. The record describes disclosure only; there is no write or execution primitive here.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can influence the prompt configuration an application passes to the loader - a tenant-supplied prompt template, an agent config pulled from a shared store, a prompt registry entry. Whether authentication is required depends on the calling application; the library itself imposes no check.

What to do

Upgrade langchain-core to 1.2.22 and restart the serving processes that import it. This is a Python dependency bump, so the cost is a rebuilt image and a rolling restart of inference or agent workers - no node drain. If you cannot upgrade immediately, stop passing externally-influenced config dicts to load_prompt()/load_prompt_from_config() and resolve prompt file paths yourself against an allowlisted directory. Red Hat has shipped errata for OpenShift AI and Ansible Automation Platform builds that vendor the library.

References

Related entries

All AI/ML frameworks & serving entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.