Intel TDX module: insecure storage of sensitive information exposes trust domain data to Ring 0 software

CVE-2026-20705Firmware, BMC & network fabriccurated

Impact

On hosts using TDX to run confidential VMs, the TDX module is the component that is supposed to keep a compromised or hostile hypervisor out of tenant memory. Intel reports that sensitive information is stored insecurely inside the module, so privileged system software on the host can read data it should not be able to see, with subsequent confidentiality impact beyond the module itself. For a GPU cloud that sells confidential-computing SKUs, this weakens the exact guarantee the tenant is paying for: the host operator (or anyone who has taken over the host) is no longer fully excluded. Intel rates the attack high complexity and it requires an already-privileged foothold on the host, so this is an erosion of the confidential-computing boundary rather than a remote break-in.

Who can reach it

Local, from privileged system software on the host (Ring 0 / VMM level). No remote or unauthenticated path; the attacker must already control privileged host software.

What to do

Apply the updated Intel TDX module per Intel SA-01436. Delivery is through Intel/OEM platform firmware channels, so plan the update per node: evacuate or shut down running trust domains, apply the update, and reboot the node before re-admitting confidential workloads. Intel's advisory is the only source for the fixed module version - check it against the exact Xeon SKUs listed rather than assuming fleet-wide applicability.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20705 https://intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01436.html

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.