GPU VulnDB

Database/Firmware, BMC & network fabric

Supermicro BMC: OS command injection in a management function executes on service restart

CVSS 7.2CVE-2026-16521Firmware, BMC & network fabriccurated

Impact

An authenticated high-privilege BMC user can inject a shell command into a BMC configuration field; the payload runs when the related BMC service restarts. That gives code execution on the baseboard management controller itself, which sits below the host OS and outside every tenant boundary and host-side agent. A compromised BMC can power-cycle the node, mount virtual media, reflash firmware, and read host console and KVM traffic, so a GPU node with a tampered BMC cannot be trusted again until the management firmware is reflashed. Because BMCs are usually reachable from one flat management VLAN, one set of leaked or shared BMC credentials turns this into fleet-wide reach.

Who can reach it

Network access to the BMC management interface, with high-privilege (administrator-level) BMC credentials. Not reachable from a tenant GPU pod unless the management network is exposed to workloads.

What to do

Apply the BMC firmware update from Supermicro's October 2026 BMC/IPMI advisory for the affected board. Flashing BMC firmware is done out of band and the BMC reboots, so schedule it with the node drained if you depend on the BMC for health and power control during the flash; the host OS itself does not need to reboot. Until flashed, keep BMC interfaces off routable networks, restrict them to a jump host, and rotate BMC administrator credentials. The advisory text available here does not list a fixed firmware version number - check the Supermicro page for the exact build for your board.

References

Related entries

All Firmware, BMC & network fabric entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.