GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Dokploy: WebSocket handlers trust serviceId, so a read-only member gets a root shell and the host via the Docker socket

CVSS 9.9CVE-2026-129316Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

Dokploy's Docker terminal, container-log and monitoring WebSocket handlers accept a caller-supplied serviceId as authorization. They do not check that the requested containerId or appName belongs to that service. A member with read access to any one service can therefore point these handlers at unrelated containers, read other tenants' logs and statistics, and open a root shell in the Dokploy panel container. The panel has the Docker socket mounted, so that shell gives control of the host and every workload on it. On a shared Dokploy instance this crosses every tenant boundary the panel is supposed to enforce.

Who can reach it

Network access to the Dokploy panel with an authenticated member account that has read access to at least one service. No admin role is needed.

What to do

Upgrade to Dokploy 0.31.0, which affects versions 0.29.13 up to that release (fixes in PRs 5716 and 5733), and restart the Dokploy stack, which interrupts in-flight deploys. The advisory publishes no workaround. If untrusted members had read access on an affected version, treat the host as possibly compromised and rotate any secrets reachable through the Docker socket.

References

Related entries

All Container, Kubernetes & orchestration entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.