GPU VulnDB

Database/Firmware, BMC & network fabric

libspdm: certificate chains checked link by link let a constrained sub-CA impersonate an SPDM device

CVSS 4.4CVE-2026-129306Firmware, BMC & network fabriccurated

Impact

libspdm_x509_verify_cert_chain() checks each certificate signature one link at a time instead of validating the whole X.509 path. As a result, pathLenConstraint and nameConstraints are not enforced. Someone who holds a valid issuer credential under a constrained CA can present a subordinate certificate that breaks those constraints, and it may still be accepted as an SPDM device identity. This matters where SPDM device attestation decides whether a device is trusted, such as GPUs, NICs and other PCIe or CXL components in confidential-computing setups. It only applies when the deployment uses a pinned root with a constrained multi-tier PKI, does no separate chain validation, and accepts identity alone without measurements. The mbedTLS backend still cannot enforce nameConstraints, because upstream mbedTLS does not implement that check.

Who can reach it

Someone who already holds a valid issuer credential below a constrained CA in the deployment's PKI (high privilege, high complexity). They present a forged device identity over SPDM to a verifier built on libspdm.

What to do

Rebuild the SPDM requester or verifier against libspdm 3.8.3 or 4.0.0-rc2. Operators usually get libspdm inside vendor firmware or attestation software, so the fix arrives as a vendor update to whatever embeds it. The record names no downstream product versions. Until then, add independent full-chain validation, or require measurements and not identity alone in the attestation policy. If you use the mbedTLS backend, do not rely on nameConstraints.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.