GPU VulnDB

Database/Firmware, BMC & network fabric

Phison E12/E18 SSD controllers: BootROM secure boot bypass allows unsigned, persistent controller firmware

CVSS 8.4CVE-2026-124017Firmware, BMC & network fabriccurated

Impact

A privileged local attacker can use Phison vendor-specific commands to write boot-patch entries into the flash ID page, which the BootROM reads with only a CRC check and no signature. A crafted entry overwrites a fuse-derived RAM variable, so the controller falls back to CRC-only firmware verification and loads an unsigned image. The result is an implant in the drive controller that runs below the host OS and survives reinstalling the firmware, so a drive can no longer be trusted as clean just because it was reimaged between tenants or jobs. E12 and E18 are client-class NVMe controllers, more likely in M.2 boot or scratch drives than in enterprise data drives, so the first step is an inventory. The record establishes persistence and secure boot bypass. It describes no remote or unprivileged path.

Who can reach it

Local attacker with high privileges on the host (root, or anyone who can send vendor-specific NVMe admin commands to the drive). No network path is described.

What to do

The record names no fixed firmware and no vendor patch, so treat this as mitigate-only. Find which nodes carry E12 or E18 based drives, and keep tenant workloads from sending raw NVMe admin or passthrough commands to the device (do not pass the NVMe controller node into containers or VMs). Because the implant survives firmware reinstallation, physically replace any drive you suspect has been tampered with rather than reflashing it. If a drive OEM ships a fix later, flashing it takes the node out of service.

References

Related entries

All Firmware, BMC & network fabric entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.