GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Kyverno: non-string attestation `type` field panics image verification, bypassing signature checks

CVSS 8.7CVE-2026-122315Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

An attacker who can push an OCI referrer manifest with a non-string type field crashes Kyverno's attestation parsing. The consequence is worse than a crash: under failurePolicy: Ignore the image-verification policy is skipped and an unverified image is admitted, and the reports-controller can be driven into a crash loop so the cluster loses its policy reporting as well. On a GPU fleet image verification is often the only control standing between a tenant-supplied container and a node holding /dev/nvidia* devices, model weights and shared fabric credentials, so a verification bypass means an unattested image can be scheduled onto a node you cannot cheaply drain.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can publish a referrer artifact in a registry that Kyverno consults - an attacker with push access to the registry, or control of any registry path a verification policy points at. NVD records the vector as unauthenticated (PR:N).

What to do

Upgrade Kyverno to 1.19.2 or later, which is an image bump plus a restart of the admission and reports controllers - no node drain. In the meantime, treat failurePolicy: Ignore on image-verification policies as an open door and consider switching those specific policies to Fail, accepting that a crash then blocks admission instead of waving images through. Also restrict which registries and referrer paths verification policies will fetch from.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.