GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

sigstore-js: registry-supplied upload Location receives registry credentials, leaking tokens to an attacker host

CVSS 7.4CVE-2026-118763Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

In @sigstore/oci before 0.7.2, signIn() puts the registry Authorization and Docker config headers on a shared HTTP client's defaults, while uploadBlob() PUTs to whatever absolute blob-upload Location the registry returns without checking the origin or scheme. A malicious or compromised registry can point a push through attachArtifactToImage() at a host it controls and collect the bearer token, Basic credentials, or custom auth headers. For an operator this is a CI/CD supply-chain credential leak: the stolen token is the one your signing pipeline uses to write to the registry that feeds GPU node images. Redirect-time header stripping does not help, because the cross-host PUT is a new explicit request. The record notes this is a residual of CVE-2026-59891, whose fix touched credential selection but not the destination check.

Who can reach it

Requires the victim to push an artifact through sigstore-js to a registry the attacker controls or has compromised - typically a CI job or a developer running the signing step. Credentials are leaked at push time; no authentication to the attacker host is needed.

What to do

Upgrade @sigstore/oci to 0.7.2, which separates registry credentials from client-wide defaults and sends them only to the registry origin, then re-run affected pipelines. Rotate any registry token that was used to push to an untrusted registry while on a vulnerable version. This is a dependency bump plus a CI restart, no node maintenance.

References

Related entries

All Container, Kubernetes & orchestration entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.