GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

MLflow: loading a SHAP explainer model deserializes untrusted data and runs arbitrary code

CVSS 7.8CVE-2026-118627AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

MLflow's SHAP explainer loader deserializes the stored explainer without validating it, so a crafted explainer model executes code as the current user. The practical exposure on a GPU fleet is the same model-supply-chain path as other MLflow deserialization bugs: an explainer pulled from a shared registry runs in the context of a notebook, evaluation job or serving process. ZDI tracks this separately from the pickle evaluation-artifact issue (CVE-2026-118623) - a different code path and a different ZDI case - so it is listed separately here. User interaction is required.

Who can reach it

A user or job must load an attacker-supplied SHAP explainer model through MLflow. No authentication needed to produce the model.

What to do

Upgrade MLflow when a fixed release is identified - the advisory in the record does not name one. Meanwhile only load explainers from registries you control and keep that work off nodes holding cluster credentials. Picking up a fix requires restarting the processes that load models.

References

Related entries

All AI/ML frameworks & serving entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.