GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

llama.cpp: crafted GGUF vocabulary writes before the heap buffer during model load

CVSS 8.5CVE-2026-116816AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

A GGUF model whose PLaMo-2 vocabulary contains a BYTE token such as <0x-1> parses to a negative index, and llama.cpp writes token ids before the start of the bytes_ allocation while loading the model. The write is attacker-controlled heap corruption inside the serving process, so the realistic outcome ranges from a crash loop of whatever loads the model to code execution as the service account. On a GPU fleet the exposure is the model supply chain: any pipeline that pulls community GGUF files, or any endpoint that lets a user point the server at a model path, turns an untrusted file into code running on the GPU node - with the node's model cache, service credentials and any other tenant work on the same host in reach. Affects b5899 through b10260.

Who can reach it

Whoever can get a GGUF file loaded by the process: a tenant or user able to upload or select a model, or anyone upstream in a model-download pipeline. No authentication to llama.cpp itself is implied; the trigger is the model file, not a request.

What to do

Upgrade llama.cpp to b10261 or later and restart the serving processes - no node drain or reboot needed. Until then, treat model files as untrusted input: load only GGUF files from a pinned, hash-verified internal mirror and do not expose a model-path or model-upload parameter to callers.

References

Related entries

All AI/ML frameworks & serving entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.