GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

vLLM: unbounded chat-template rendering lets one request wedge or exhaust the serving process

CVSS 6.5CVE-2026-115911AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

When no server-side --chat-template is configured, a caller can supply a chat template with the request, and a malicious model repository can ship one; either is compiled and rendered by tokenizer.apply_chat_template() with no wall-clock timeout, output-size cap, or iteration bound. Rendering runs in a ThreadPoolExecutor that defaults to a single worker, so a non-terminating template keeps occupying that worker after the request has ended and /v1/responses plus every other chat-template consumer stops making progress. An output-expanding template instead grows host memory until the process is killed. On a GPU node that is the whole endpoint for every tenant sharing the model, and recovery means restarting the server and reloading weights onto the device. Harmony models do not use this Jinja path and are unaffected.

Who can reach it

An authenticated caller of the OpenAI-compatible API (CVSS: network, low privileges) on a server started without --chat-template, or anyone who controls the model repository the server loads from.

What to do

Upgrade to vLLM 0.32.0 (fix commit cff08b46) and restart the serving processes; weights reload, so expect the usual model-load outage per replica rather than a node drain. Until then, start the server with an explicit trusted --chat-template so request-supplied templates are not used, and load models only from repositories you control.

References

Related entries

All AI/ML frameworks & serving entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.