GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Traefik: plaintext HTTP router forwards client-supplied Ssl-Client-* headers, allowing mTLS identity spoofing

CVSS 7.0CVE-2026-114640Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

When auth-tls-pass-certificate-to-upstream is set and ssl-redirect is disabled, Traefik's plaintext HTTP router passes attacker-controlled Ssl-Client-* headers straight through to the backend. An unauthenticated caller can send Ssl-Client-Verify: SUCCESS with any subject and issuer it likes and the backend will treat it as a verified mTLS client. Any service that trusts those headers for authorization - a common pattern for internal APIs, schedulers and model endpoints behind an ingress - can be impersonated as an arbitrary identity, including an administrative one.

Who can reach it

Unauthenticated, over the network. The attacker needs to reach Traefik's plain HTTP entry point with the Ingress host and set its own request headers.

What to do

Upgrade Traefik to v3.7.14 and roll the ingress controller. As an immediate mitigation, re-enable ssl-redirect on affected Ingresses or stop backends from trusting Ssl-Client-* headers; controller restart only, no node maintenance.

References

Related entries

All Container, Kubernetes & orchestration entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.