GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

SGLang: unauthenticated debug dumper endpoint executes Python in the scheduler process

CVSS 9.2CVE-2026-111391AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

An attacker who can reach the dumper port sends a filter expression that escapes the eval() sandbox via re.search __globals__ and runs arbitrary Python inside the SGLang scheduler process on the next forward pass. That process owns the model weights, the GPU context and whatever credentials the serving pod holds, so this is full compromise of the inference workload and a foothold on the GPU node from which to reach the rest of the namespace. No authentication is required on the endpoint. The exposure only exists when DUMPER_SERVER_PORT is set, which is a debug/profiling configuration rather than the default - but it is the kind of setting that gets left on after a performance investigation.

Who can reach it

Anyone with network reach to the SGLang dumper port (DUMPER_SERVER_PORT) - any tenant pod on the same cluster network, or anyone on the internet if the port was published alongside the inference port. Unauthenticated.

What to do

Unset DUMPER_SERVER_PORT and restart the SGLang server - that removes the endpoint immediately and is the fastest mitigation. Affected versions are 0.5.10 through 0.5.22; the record does not name a fixed release, so track the upstream issue for one. Where the dumper is genuinely needed, bind it to localhost and keep it off any shared pod network. Rolling the serving replicas drains in-flight requests but needs no node reboot.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.