GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

docling-serve: memory telemetry endpoints omit the auth dependency, exposing stats and forced GC

CVSS 6.3CVE-2026-108749AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

Two endpoints in docling-serve 1.14.0 through 1.36.0 are registered without the require_auth dependency, so DOCLING_SERVE_API_KEY does not protect them. An unauthenticated caller reads process and cgroup memory telemetry and object-type histograms, and can force repeated gc.collect() heap enumeration. The telemetry leaks the container's cgroup limits and working-set shape - useful reconnaissance against a document conversion service that sits in front of GPU-backed layout and OCR models - and the forced garbage collection is an unauthenticated way to burn CPU and stall request handling in the serving process. There is no code execution or document content disclosure here; the loss is confidentiality of runtime telemetry plus a cheap availability lever.

Who can reach it

Network, unauthenticated. Anyone who can reach the docling-serve HTTP port, which on most clusters means any tenant pod on the service network, since operators assume the API key gates the whole service.

What to do

Upgrade past 1.36.0 to a release that applies require_auth to the memory endpoints. In the meantime block /v1/memory/* at the ingress, service mesh or network policy in front of docling-serve - the endpoints are diagnostic and nothing in normal operation calls them. Either path is a container image bump and pod restart, or a routing rule change; no node drain or reboot.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.