GPU VulnDB

Database/AI/ML frameworks & serving

Docker Sandboxes: egress proxy strips only sentinel-valued credentials, letting sandboxed code attach its own

CVSS 5.9CVE-2026-105452AI/ML frameworks & servingcurated

Impact

The host egress proxy removed client-supplied credentials only when their values matched known sentinel values, so untrusted code in an authorized sandbox could set an unrecognized credential in another supported authentication header and have it forwarded alongside the host-injected one. For upstream services that honour the attacker's header, the request authenticates to an account the attacker controls, and whatever data the request carried - prompts, context, files pulled from the sandbox - lands in that account. This is a data-exfiltration channel out of a sandbox that an operator is relying on to contain agent workloads, and it is separate from the response-masking failure in CVE-2026-101998. The record reports confidentiality impact only.

Who can reach it

Code running inside an authorized sandbox, no additional authentication needed beyond being allowed to run there; the CVSS 4.0 vector given is local with no privileges required and a passive attack requirement.

What to do

Update Docker Sandboxes to a fixed release and restart the sandbox tooling. The record cites only Docker's sandbox and credential-injection documentation and names no fixed version, so check Docker's release notes for the version that stops forwarding alternate authentication headers. Until then, review upstream service logs for requests that authenticated to unexpected accounts, and avoid giving sandboxes proxy access to services whose data you cannot afford to see posted elsewhere.

References

Related entries

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.